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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Assistant Director, OCD

SUBJECT: G-2 releases of intelligence materials to
CIA

1. By memorandum of June 28th to G-2 the Director stated that unjustifiable delays had taken place within G-2 in releasing intelligence materials to CIA, and requested that prompt action be taken to avoid any such delays in future.

2. In a reply dated 30 June General Bolling stated: "In a conversation with [redacted] I could find no specific instance other than a telecon that was withheld from your Agency, inasmuch as the telecon referred to was an operational matter and not within the province of intelligence... On matters of military operations, not involving intelligence, each case must be judged on its merit. Release to your Agency of telecons or communications originating from a higher source will be requested and, if approved, prompt delivery will be made."

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3. General Bolling has taken personal action within G-2 to improve the situation, and at this moment I am hopeful that his action will prove to have been sufficiently effective to resolve most of our difficulties. But it must be stated for the record that his written reply, as quoted above, is evasive and unsatisfactory. What it means in simple English is: "If you ask for anything that we choose to regard as operational we will pass the buck to higher authority", and the net result will be precisely the kind of delay to which we have objected. It should also be stated that the telecon was not the only item mentioned by Messrs. Covell and Hancock in their conversation with General Bolling. All traffic which is "ACTION G-3, INFO G-2", is involved, as well as the "G-2 Projects" which are comparable to CIA'S "Intelligence Memoranda".

4. I have made an appointment to see General Bolling at 1100 on July 5th, and I intend that this meeting shall be all sweetness and light. But if he tackles me on the operational business I intend to insist 1) that operational traffic sent to G-2 for information is sent there because it is of interest to military intelligence, 2) that items of importance to military intelligence are of importance to national

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intelligence, and 3) that if G-2 cannot make arrangements for such traffic to go promptly and spontaneously to CIA then CIA will have to report this fact to higher authority and make formal request that the bottleneck, wherever it is, be opened up. There is no reason why CIA should not appear as an information addressee on any item, from any source, which is sent to G-2 for information, and if G-2 cannot function efficiently as a pipeline between G-3 and CIA, then a direct pipeline will have to be established.

5. Our greatest source of trouble with G-2 is not at the level of Generals Irwin and Bolling, but at the level a few notches down where Colonels and Majors are able, if they see fit, to say: "This is mainly operational dope, and I'll have to get clearance on it from G-3, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or G-2 Headquarters, or whatever". General Bolling personally told several of these officers, in the presence of Covell and Heacock, that they "were to give CIA whatever CIA wanted", and this action may prove effective.

6. In talking with General Bolling I shall make every effort to avoid controversy of any sort, as I believe we should now wait to see whether we do or do not get results.

JAMES M. ANDREWS